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PROPOSED REGULATION OF LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

Although the limited partnership' is not a new development in
American law, 2 the popularity of this type of enterprise organization has increased dramatically in recent years, particularly as
a vehicle for investment in real estate and oil and gas syndication.3 Investors desiring maximum return on venture capital have
discovered that certain limited partnership investment programs
can offer them "flow through" tax shelter advantages, substantial
capital leverage, and limited liability, while saddling them with
virtually no management responsibility. 4 Unfortunately, general
partners have simultaneously discovered the windfalls available
through exploitation of nonmanaging limited partners. This exploitation is achieved by means of abusive practices typically
including adhesion contracts, general partners' engaging in

Section 1 of the UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT defines a limited partnership to
be
a partnership formed by two or more persons ... having as members one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partners
as such shall not be bound by the obligations of the partnership.
The two fundamental principles of a limited partnership are: (I) a limited partner, in
exchange for limited liability, conforms to statutory requirements of filing a certificate and
refrains from participation in the conduct of the business; and (2) upon failure to adhere to
these statutory requirements he loses his limited liability privilege and becomes liable as a
general partner. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Comment [hereinafter cited as

U LPA].
2The limited partnership is a statutory creature conceived to permit lenders to take a
share of business profits in lieu of interest without exposing themselves to full liability as a
general partner. The concept was introduced in this hemisphere through the French
Soci6t6 en Commandit6 when Louisiana was a French dependency. The first Limited
Partnership Act was adopted by New York in 1822. ULPA § I, Comment.
3 The following explanation has been given for this increase:
Although no statistics are available it seems probable that limited partnerships were sparingly used until World War II. A considerable increase then
came about largely because of high federal income tax rates. The limited
partnership is unique in combining (A) direct deduction of expenses or losses
by members against their other income, and (B) protection of personal
liability. Thus it has become popular with high income individuals investing
in high-risk enterprises .... The popularity is even greater if there are special
tax benefits like deduction of drilling costs and percentage depletion in oil
and gas ventures or accelerated depreciation in construction or leasing activities.
A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 150 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
4

These advantages are discussed in part I infra.
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conflicts of interest, and misleading promotional and statistical
presentations. 5
Limited partners have long been admonished to scrutinize potential investments; 6 this advice is often ignored, however, by
investors eager to reap quick profits. Furthermore, the proliferation of limited partnership interests in a single enterprise diffuses
the focus of investor vigilance and increases the potential for
undetected abuses. Thus a need for regulation, either governmental or private, has developed. Currently the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act and blue sky laws provide some control of limited
partnership abuses at the state level. On the interstate level, the
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have programs or proposals which address
these abuses. 7 This article analyzes these existing and proposed
programs in terms of the competing interests of general and limited partners.
1. ADVANTAGES OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP FORMAT
OVER THE CORPORATE FORMAT

The motivation for investing venture capital in a limited part5 See generally Braislin, Public Limited Partnerships in Northwest Real Estate Syndication, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 74 (1971).

6 Francis Troubat, in one of the earliest definitive works on the American limited
partnership, recognized the necessity for care in selecting a general partner:
Do you know your intended general partner? Have you read his soul and
compassed the calibre of his mind? Disaster will be sure to attend you, if you
fall into the hands of a man who is without a deep sense of probity, and
without the judgment and talent adequate to manage your property for your
mutual benefit.
F. TROUBAT,

THE LAW OF

COMMANDATARY

AND

LIMITED

PARTNERSHIPS

IN

THE

1 (1853).
7Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, Statement of Policy Regarding Real

UNITED STATES

Estate Limited Partnership, CCH 1972 BLUE SKY L. REP. No. 458 [hereinafter cited as
MSCAJ; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., TAX SHELTERED PROGRAMS, PROPOSED ARTICLE IIl, SECTION 33 OF RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE AND PROPOSED
REGULATIONS TO BE ADOPTED PURSUANT THERETO (1972) [hereinafter cited as NASD];

SEC Proposed Legislation, Regulation of Oil and Gas Programs, CCH 1972 FED. SEC.
L. REP. No. 428 [hereinafter cited as SEC]. The NASD is an organization Of
over-the-counter securities dealers which regulates itself under the supervision of the SEC.
Established by the Maloney Act (Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(3) (1970)) in 1938, the NASD offers members participation in investment
banking and over-the-counter securities business on a preferential basis in exchange for
their adherence to standards of ethical conduct established by the NASD. The SEC may
review and overrule any NASD rule and may suspend or revoke its registration if it fails to
enforce compliance with those rules. CCH 1971 NASD MANUAl
101, 102, 107.
The MSCA is an association of state securities administrators of the twenty-four
member states. A policy statement of the MSCA represents the consensus of the administrators of member states and is not binding on the individual member state unless it is
expressly adopted or followed by the individual state. CCH 1969 BLUE SKY L.
REP. 475 1.
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nership rather than in a corporation arises from the fact that the
former can offer tax shelter advantages and capital leverage as
well as limited liability.
A. Income Tax Advantages
In the corporate setting revenues may be taxed twice: as income to the corporation and as dividend income to the shareholder upon distribution.8 A limited partnership, however, is
treated as a conduit through which income passes for taxation at
the individual level. 9 Therefore, the limited partner avoids the
double taxation that distributed earnings of the enterprise suffer in
the corporate setting, and he may deduct his share of the partnership expenses against his individual income from whatever
source.10
A very valuable framework of large deductible expenses may
be developed from accelerated depreciation"' on buildings purchased or built by real estate syndications, or through prepaid
drilling expenses1 2 in oil and gas programs. By being offset against
gross income, these deductible expenses can shelter the cash flow
generated from an enterprise. The enterprise may in fact be
13
profitable, although on paper it generates no taxable earnings.
Moreover, if initial deductible expenses are sufficiently high that a
loss is generated, the amount of the loss may be set off against an
investor's income from other sources.1 4 Finally, even upon bank15
ruptcy, which can occur even though the partnership is solvent,
the limited partner loses only his investment and is entitled to an
ordinary loss deduction in the amount of the adjusted basis of his

BINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ I, II, 61. The validity of this comparison assumes that
the participants in a real estate or oil and gas investment program would distribute all
profits and thereby incur double taxation. Although this enterprise could take the form of a
Subchapter S corporation, id. §§ 137 1- 1379, the availability of this option is restricted to
groups of ten or fewer members. Since the proposals to be evaluated herein are concerned
primarily with programs of greater size, see notes 52 and 53 infra, it is not particularly
useful to compare the advantages of limited partnerships and Subchapter S corporations.
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
10 Id. §§ 702, 703.
11 Id. § 167.
12 Id. § 263(c).
13 In other words, the cash receipts earned, while less than total expenses on paper, may
exceed actual out-of-pocket expenditures.
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 702, 703. A more complete description of the tax

advantage may be found in Content, Tax Aspects of Real Estate Syndications, in INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION,

CREATIVE REAL ESTATE FINANCING

145,

158 (1968).
15 If all the general partners are adjudged bankrupt, the partnership will also be adjudged
bankrupt. See I I U.S.C. § 23() (1970).
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partnership interest even though it exceeds the amount of his
16
capital account on the partnership books.
There are, however, countervailing considerations. Cash flow
distributed in excess of a limited partner's basis [7 will result in
income taxable to him,' and partnership losses in excess of the
investor's basis are not currently deductible' 9 although they may
be recognized upon sale of the partnership interest.20 Furthermore
the tax shelter effect suffers from the limitations on the kinds of
real estate which can be depreciated at an accelerated rate, 2' from
the recapture of depreciation under Section 1250,22 and from the
additional surtax on the accelerated depreciation as a tax preference item.2 3 While new residential rental property may be depreciated at a rate of 200 percent declining balance 24 and low income
rental housing may be fully depreciated in five years, 25 nonresidential property can be depreciated at a maximum of 150 percent
declining balance. 26 Furthermore upon disposition of this property, the accelerated portion of the depreciation (above straight line)
27
must be recognized as gain to the limited partner.
Although these restrictions would seem to suggest the elimination of the substantial tax shelter benefits of the limited partnership, careful advance planning will preserve significant tax savings
if the sale of a partnership interest is coordinated with the point
where cash flow and Section 1250 recapture will result in the least
taxable income. 28
B. Capital Leverage
An investor who purchases an interest in a partnership under a
1954, § 705; Rev. Rul. 70-335, 1970- I CuM. BULL. I 11.
basis for a partner's interest in a partnership is his basis in the property he

16 INT. REV. CODE OF
'7The

contributes plus his share of the partnership liabilities. Each partner's basis is increased
annually by his distributive share of the enterprise's income and reduced annually by
distributions received from the partnership and by his distributive share of partnership
losses. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 705.
8
1id. § 751.
19
Id. § 704(d).
20
d. § 704(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
22
Id. § 1250.
23

1d. §§ 56-58. In 1969 Congress defined certain advantages as tax preference items
and for succeeding taxable years imposed a surtax of 10 percent on the excess of these
items over an amount determined under a statutory formula, id. § 57. Among these tax
preference items are accelerated depreciation on real property, id. § 57(a)(2), and percentage depletion, id. § 57(a)(8).
24 Id. § 1676)(2).
25 Id. § 167(k).
26
27
28

1d. § 1670)(1).
1d. § 1250.
See Content, supra note 14, at 165, 166, for a detailed graphic explanation of how to

accomplish the coordination of sale within minimum tax expense.
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deferred payment option may benefit from capital appreciation
much the same way he might when buying stock on margin. One
author has given the following explanation of the leverage feature:
Leverage results when an individual acquires his limited partnership "interest" under an agreement resembling an installment contract. His initial contribution is usually to a pro
rata share of the down payment on the purchase price of the
land, plus related expenses. Subsequent contributions made
periodically are used to pay the balance owing on the property. Assuming the fair market value of the land appreciates
quickly and the land is sold before the full purchase price is
realizes a substantial profit upon his
paid, the limited partner
29
minimum investment.
The leverage advantage in interstate programs is subject, at least
in the immediate future, to a fatal restriction established by the
Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of Section 7(a) of its
Regulation T,3 0 which in effect prevents a broker/dealer from
arranging credit on terms more favorable than he himself could
grant to his customers if he sold partnership units on a periodic
payment basis9 l Any utilization of deferred payments is
effectively restricted to intrastate programs which undoubtedly
will increase in economic significance as these programs respond
to the availability of the intrastate exemption in the Securities Act
of 193332 to escape not only Regulation T but also planned
federal regulation by the SEC.3 3
C. Limited Liability
Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partner
is liable for limited partnership losses only to the extent of his
investment. 3 4 General partners too may achieve limited liability
29 Braislin, supra note 5, at 79.
30 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1970) reads:

A creditor may arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit to or for
any customer of such creditor by any person upon the same terms and
conditions as those upon which the creditor, under the provisions of this part,

may himself extend or maintain such credit to such customer, ...
31 "The act [Section 7(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934] and § 220.7(a)

also provide in substance that any such broker or dealer shall not arrange for any
extension or maintenance of credit on unregistered securities." 12 C.F.R. § 220.109
(1972).
32 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) (1972).
33 See SEC, supra note 7.
34 ULPA § I. This limited liability, however, may be lost if the limited partner's name
appears in the partnership name (id. § 5(2) ), if the limited partner knows of a false
9tatement in the certificate which is relied upon by another party to his detriment (id. § 6),
or if the limited partner takes part in the control of the business (id. § 7).
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by incorporating the general partner, thus eliminating all individual liability of any participant in the enterprise. Such an arrangement, however, may be subject to attack by the Internal Revenue
Service. Treasury Regulations state that if an organization qualifies as a limited partnership under local laws it may be classified
for tax purposes either as an ordinary partnership or as an association. If classified as the latter the program will be given corporate

tax treatment. 35
II.

POTENTIAL ABUSES BY GENERAL PARTNERS

The reverse side of the advantages of limited partnership is the
potential for general partners to abuse this form of enterprise
organization to the detriment of limited partners. These abuses
However a person believing himself to be a limited partner does not become subject to
general partner liability if he promptly renounces his interest in the partnership profits. See
id. § 1I. Notwithstanding Section I an investor should be sure that the general partner's
liability to creditors is not effectively passed to him through the device of mandatory
assessments couched in the language of the program contract. For a further discussion of
the mandatory assessment, see note 37 infra.
35 In analyzing an organization's status, the Internal Revenue Service applies a four-part
test. If it finds that more than two parts of the test are satisfied, the entity will be
characterized and taxed as a corporation. The four corporate characteristics constituting
the elements of the test are as follows:
(1) Centralized Management-An organization has centralized management if any person (or any group of persons which does not include all the members) has continuing
exclusive authority to make management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed. A limited partnership which has a substantial
portion of its interest held by nonmanaging limited partners obviously does have centralized management. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(I) (1960).
(2) Limited Liability - An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under local law there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims
against the corporation. To prevent the partnership from being attributed with the corporate characteristic of limited liability, a corporation acting as the general partner must
have substantial assets other than those in the partnership program. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960). The Commissioner has specifically defined what is meant by a
corporation having substantial assets. If the limited partnership has total contributions of
$2,500,000, the corporate general partner must have a net worth equal to the lesser of 15
percent of contributions or $250,000. If the total program contributions exceed
$2,500,000, the corporation must have a net worth of at least 10 percent of contributions.
In addition the limited partners in aggregate may not own either directly or indirectly more
than 20 percent of the corporation. Int. Rev. Svc. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-2 INT. REV.
BULL. 26.

(3) Continuity of Life-An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the organization. Thus a partnership does not have continuity if it ceases to
exist upon the death of the general partner or at any other specific point in time. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
(4) Free Transferability-An organization has the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests if each of its members who collectively own substantially all of the
interests in the organization has the power, without the consent of other members, to
substitute for himself a person who is not a member of the organization. A requirement
that the general partner must approve all transfers of interest by limited partners provides
sufficient restraint to avoid this element of the test. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
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can be categorized as arising from unequal bargaining power
conducive to adhesion contracts, from manipulation of management power, and from other miscellaneous causes related to mis36
statement or withholding of information.
A. Abuse by Contractsof Adhesion
The popularity of limited partnerships has led to massmarketing techniques for these programs generating reduction in
the price of individual partnership interests and a concomitant
increase in the number of investors. This development enhances
the bargaining position of the general partner, and exploitation of
this favorable position is illustrated in some of the terms common
in limited partnership agreements. Mandatory assessment clauses
conditioned upon cost overruns or other misfortune are a typical
example. 7 A clause of this nature effectively insulates the general
partner from the risk of loss from his own poor management. In
effect it is the investor's waiver of his limited liability. Penalty
provisions dictating loss of future participation rights or outright
forfeiture of partnership interest have been included to encourage
compliance with such mandatory assessment clauses. 8 Another
manifestation of the abuse of the general partner's bargaining
power is the blind pool limited partnership arrangement. In a blind
pool, the limited partnership agreement imposes no limitation on
the specific usage of the funds invested. This gives the general
partner the broadest possible discretion and is recognized as
among the highest risk ventures in the tax shelter area because it
permits the general partner to invest in any assets he desires, thus
giving him the opportunity to invest the funds of others in assets
he owns either directly or indirectly.
B. Manipulationof Management Prerogatives
Conflicts of interest may also precipitate abuses by general
partners effected through their control of the management process. As one commentator has explained, the general partner
36 The discussion which follows is by no means exhaustive; it does however provide a
perspective from which to evaluate recent regulatory proposals of private and public
officials. Since the general partner often performs the functions of syndicator, promoter,
and broker, all of whom have an identity of interests distinct from that of the limited
partners, references to any party associated with the limited partnership other than limited
partners should be construed as synonomous with a reference to the general partner in the
discussion of these proposed regulations.
37 The assessment clause typically enables management to obtain on demand an additional amount of capital from the limited partner beyond his subscription commitment.
38 Braislin, supra note 5, at 89.
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purchasing and selling land or other assets for the partnership can
often manipulate purchase and sale prices. If the property is sold
to the limited partnership by a land company affiliated with the
general partner, he can determine the total price that the investors
will be obligated to pay. If this price is more than the land
company paid, the difference represents income to the land company and the general partner. 39 Moreover, the general partner can
also control the price of land as it leaves the limited partnership.
For example, if the general partner authorized a purchase from
the land company at a high estimated value and sale to the
(affiliated) development company at a low estimated value, the
limited partnership would show a relatively small profit and the
limited partners would be deprived of their fair share of the land
value appreciation. 40 In addition, those investors who depend on
leverage, expecting the property to be sold before more than a
fraction of their monetary obligation accrues, can be sorely disappointed by the general partner who continues to hold the land,
forcing the investors to make continuing contributions.
Property transfers involving affiliates give rise to other aspects
of self-dealing. General partners are frequently compensated by
fees or commissions for locating, negotiating for, and acquiring
land as well as for acting as a real estate agent when land is sold.
When an affiliate is the other party in these transactions, however,
the general partner is actually dealing with himself and in reality
has not earned these fees.
C. MiscellaneousAbuses
In addition to the specialized problems afflicting tax shelter
investment programs discussed above, limited partnerships are
also subject to common varieties of corruption, including kickbacks from associates to whom the managers distribute the partnership's contracted work, partnership loans without interest to
the general partner which may subsequently be forgiven, and
failure to report to the participants the program's financial position, its activities, or its tax status. These abuses arise from the
remoteness of the unsupervised general partner from the limited
partners, dissipating the limited partner's return on investment
and crippling his efforts to invest knowledgeably.

39
40

Id. at 8 1.
Id.
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CURRENT RESPONSES TO ABUSIVE PRACTICES

A. Intrastate Regulation
At the state level limited partnerships have been regulated at
least since the advent of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA). 4 1 Although the ULPA in conjunction with the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) injects some uniformity into the law governing limited partnerships, it nevertheless suffers from confinement to the limitations of state jurisdiction. 42 Furthermore, the
statute itself was not directed toward the abuses discussed above.
Except for the fiduciary duty imposed by Section 21 of the UPA,
no part of the UPA-ULPA scheme43 purports to regulate general
partner compensation. 4 4 While the ULPA makes clear that the
limited partner is liable for unpaid installments toward his partnership interest, it fails to restrain the general partner from cancelling
the limited partner's equitable interest (consisting of his in-

41

As of 1971, forty-five states, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia had

adopted the ULPA. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 559 (Supp. 1972 at 37). Notwith-

standing the goal of uniformity, the adopting states have modified the act so that nonuniform results in application are probable. For example, under Section 25, establishing
requirements for amendment and for cancellation of a certificate, thirty-five states have
substituted significant words, phrases, and sections for those drafted into the uniform act.
To Subsection 5 establishing events cancelling or amending the certificate, California adds
the proviso that the amendment is void as to a purchaser of goods whose conveyance is
duly recorded before recording of the amended certificate. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15525(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1972). To Subsection 3 enabling one to petition for cancellation of the
certificate in court, New Jersey adds that the court may proceed in the action in a
summary manner or otherwise. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:2-29(3) (Supp. 1972).
42 Since the governance of partnerships is a matter of state law, investment programs
face the possibility of varying interpretations of the uniform act, as well as variations in the
actual language of the act. See note 41 supra. In addition, unless a state has an appropriate
long-arm statute it may face substantial difficulties in enforcing its statute against a
nonresident who markets his shares privately through the mails to residents.
43 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6 indicates that the UPA governs limited, as well as
regular, partnerships to the extent that other statutes, such as the ULPA, are not inconsistent with its provisions.
44 Section 21(I) of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT provides that

every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
Although this language has been interpreted to prohibit a partner from self-dealing during
the life of a joint venture, In re Kohn's Estate, 26 Misc. 2d 659, 116 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sur.
Ct.), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1045, 126 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1952), Section 21 requires only the
holding of profits obtained without consent of the partners, as from an unauthorized
transaction, to insure distribution of these profits to the other partners as directed by the
agreement. This section does not, however, prevent a general partner from incorporating
generous compensation clauses in the agreement itself. As the court in Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947), notes "[G]ood faith.and fair dealing
require that neither party [to the agreement for the division of profits] may be permitted
to... enjoy greater rights than called for by the terms of the agreement."

474
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stallment payments to date) by penalties or forfeiture. 45 Loans to
limited partners are regulated but no comparable restriction is
placed on loans to the general partner. 46 Finally, the act imposes
no disclosure requirements on the general partner, although limit47
ed partners may obtain financial information upon demand.
State schemes for securities regulation similarly suffer from the
problems of jurisdictional boundaries, lack of uniformity, and,
additionally, obsolescence. As one commentator has noted, the
novelty of limited partnership investment programs and the inapplicability of traditional standards used to evaluate investment
securities has meant that most blue sky administrators may fail to
control elements of the general partner's compensation plan and
4
his financial interest in the enterprise.

B. Interstate Proposals
The security industry's response to the need for regulation of
limited partnerships on an interstate level is manifested primarily
in three regulatory schemes. The Midwest Securities Commissioners Association (MSCA) has drafted a set of guidelines for
real estate limited partnerships which it proposes to recommend
for enforcement by member states. 49 The National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) has developed a program of regu50
lation which would be binding on its over-the-counter dealers.
Finally, the federal government, through the SEC, has proposed a
federal regulatory scheme for oil and gas programs. 51 Presumably
the NASD and SEC regulatory schemes do not apply to entities
which come within an exemption to the registration requirements

45
ULPA § 17; see also text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
46
ULPA § 13.
47
1d. § 10(1)(b).
48 Mosburg, Regulation of Tax Shelter Investment, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 207, 217 (1972):
[lIn the critical area of promoter compensation and promotional interest, only
California had established rules, and even California's rules had been developed prior to the evaluation of "second generation" programs that saw a
substantial change in the structure of program format and participation formula.
(footnotes omitted). For California's rules, see 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §H 260.140.111-.124
(1971).
49 MSCA, supra note 7.
5o NASD, supra note 7. The National Association of Securities Dealers proposal
incorporates in large part the guidelines adopted by the North American Securities Administrators (Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Drilling Programs CCH 1971
BLUE SKY L. REP.
4581-83). For a comparative analysis of the NASD and NASA
programs, see Mosburg, supra note 48, at 222, 223.
51 SEC, supra note 7.
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of the Securities and Exchange Act. 52 Likewise, while the MSCA

proposal mentions no exemptions, it too may be avoided by resort
to statutory exemptions provided by the securities laws of member states. 53 Nevertheless, these proposals would apply to limited
partnership arrangements dealing with larger numbers of investors
(generally over twenty-five for the NASD and MSCA proposals,
and over thirty-five for the SEC proposal) who are likely to have
smaller average investments. Indeed such investment programs
are more likely to need administrative scrutiny than entities composed of fewer limited partners investing larger sums who are
presumably more capable of protecting themselves.
1. Insuring Competent and Responsible Management-The
three regulatory schemes can be usefully compared in terms of
their approaches to the areas of abuse which plague limited partnerships. In order to insure responsible management and investor
influence each of the three schemes has established minimum
requirements for participation by general partners and has created
voting rights for limited partners. The MSCA proposal requires
that a general partner have three years experience in his area of
operation, 54 and have a net worth of $50,000 or 15 percent of the
first $2,500,000 raised in the program plus 10 percent of all assets
in excess of $2,500,000. 55 These provisions are designed to guarantee skill and solvency on the part of the general partner. In
blind pool programs (nonspecified property syndications) the requirements are more stringent. A general partner must have five
years experience 56 and must have investable funds of $1,000,000. 5 7 Moreover the investor must purchase

in units of

$5,000 for blind pool offerings and $2,500 on all other offerings. 58
In addition, the prospective limited partner presumably will face
appropriate investor suitability standards related to the character
of the particular program. 59 These latter provisions are intended
to insure that only comparatively sophisticated investors who can
evaluate risk and absorb loss are involved in these investment
52The primary possibilities for exemption from registration are the private offering

exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962),
and the intrastate exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(l I), SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
53 For example, Indiana exempts offerings to a group of twenty or fewer. IND. STAT.
ANN. § 23-2-I-2(b)(10) (1972). In Michigan the figure is fifteen persons. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. Sec. 451.802(b)(9) (Supp. 1972). In Ohio the number is twenty-five persons.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(M)(2) (Supp. 1972).
54 MSCA, supra note 7, § II. A.
55 Id. § l.B.
56 Id. § V I. B.
57
1d. § VI. A.
58
1d. § Ill. D.
59
Id. §§ II1. A, B.
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programs. To facilitate an analysis of the partnership enterprise
the MSCA proposal additionally establishes a program of full
disclosures. 6 o
The NASD proposal requires the general partner to have five
years experience and a net worth of 10 percent of contributions or
$100,000, whichever is more. 6 1 In addition, oil and gas programs
must have a minimum public sale of $250,000.62 The NASD also
requires disclosure of financial and tax data; 63 if tax disclosures
are not made, investors are permitted to withdraw from all except
oil and gas programs. 6 4 The NASD also requires a $5,000 minimum investor purchase 65 but only for oil and gas programs, and
imposes on the broker the responsibility of requiring that limited
partners have a net worth of $50,000 and have incomes that are
66
taxed at a marginal rate of at least 50 percent.
The SEC proposal sets no minimum investment requirements
for limited partners although it authorizes registered securities
associations to set such limits; 67 it does establish, however, a
requirement that the program collect a total of $250,000 before
operation can begin. 68 The minimum net worth requirement for
general partners is set at the greater of (a) $250,000 or (b) the
lesser of either $1,000,000 or 5 percent of total contributions. 69 In
addition the SEC proposal prohibits participation by general partners convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving similar activ70
ity within the previous ten years.
While the NASD and SEC proposals call for the use of escrow
or custodial accounts to protect proceeds during initial collection, 71 the MSCA depends upon a fiduciary duty similar to that
enunciated in Section 21 of the UPA for protection of the limited
60 See text accompanying notes 123- 35 infra.
61 NASD, supra note 7, §§ 2(a), (b).
6
2Id. § 2(c)(I).
63 If the tax benefits described in the prospectus cannot be demonstrated by a favorable
ruling from the Internal Revenue Service, the investor may withdraw his capital.
Id. §§ 2(e)(1), (2).
64 All funds received must be placed in escrow until a favorable ruling or counsel's
opinion is received. Id. § 2(e)(2).
6 Id. § 2(f).
6 Id. §§ 5(b)(2), (3). These sections require that the broker/dealer limit sales of program
units to customers, who, after giving effect to all of their tax sheltered investments, are
reasonably anticipated to be in a 50 percent federal tax bracket. It is not entirely clear
under the wording of these provisions whether an investor with $50,000 gross income but
no taxable income would meet this standard. The more likely presumption, however, is
that such an investor does in fact qualify under these sections.
67
68 SEC, supra note 7, § 19(a)(l).
id. § 12(2).
69

Id.§ 13(a)(1).

70 Id. § 8.
71NASD, supra note 7, § C; SEC, supra note 7, § 12.
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partner.72 Also each proposal provides specific voter rights ranging from a simple removal power 73 in all three proposals to a
power to make fundamental policy determinations in the SEC
proposal .74

These three regulatory schemes are also directed at counteracting specific abuses which arise from partnership agreements of
adhesion, in particular mandatory assessments and penalties for
subsequent nonpayment.7 5 The MSCA's answer to this problem
is to limit the general partner's capacity to compel limited partners
to contribute beyond their initial investments, the maximum permissible assessment being an amount equivalent to the increase in
taxes or other governmental obligations on the property. 76 The
proposal also requires that the general partner employ only fair
and equitable remedies in the event of default by a limited partner.
Reasonable penalties may take the form of reducing the limited
partner's proportionate interest in the partnership, subordinating
his interest to that of nondefaulting partners, or forcing sale of his
77
interest; his interest, however, shall not be subject to forfeiture.
Finally, the scheme entirely prohibits assessments for blind
78
pools.
The similar approaches of the NASD and SEC limit mandatory
79
assessments to 15 percent of the limited partner's investment.
These proposals also prohibit the use of unfair remedies as penalties for failing to meet assessments. In addition, the NASD prohibits the jeopardizing of the defaulting limited partner's right to
invest in future optional development wells (oil and gas), as the
partnership develops these new wells, without disclosure and
requires full disclosure of potential assessments.8 0
These measures regulating the general partner's experience, net
worth, and capitalization are apparently intended to insure that
the general partner is competent, financially responsible, and sol72 The general partner shall have fiduciary responsibility for the safekeeping

and use of all funds and assets of the syndicate, whether or not in his
immediate possession or control, and . . . he shall not employ ...

such funds

or assets in any manner except for the exclusive benefit of the syndicate.
MSCA, supra note 7, § IX. A.
73 For removal of the general partner, each program requires a simple majority of
outstanding shares to constitute a successful removal vote. MSCA, supra note 7, § VII. B;
NASD,
supra note 7, § 3(a); SEC, supra note 7, § 13(b).
74
The SEC proposal requires a majority vote to authorize the general partner to borrow
or loan money, to make assessments, and to purchase or sell securities, real estate, or
commodities. SEC, supra note 7, § I I(b)(2).
75 See text accompanying notes 37- 38 supra.
76 MSCA, supra note 7, § VII. G.
77
1d. § VII. H.
id. § VI. F.
79 NASD, supra note 7, § 2(i); SEC, supra note 7. § 9(e).
80 NASD, supra note 7, § 2(k).
78
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vent. However, the programs differ in their usage of these devices. First, while the MSCA and NASD each require a level of
experience for general partners, the SEC does not. Second, both
the NASD and SEC demand a minimum total capitalization in
order to avoid early failures resulting from inadequate financing,
but the MSCA requires minimum capitalization only for blind
pools. Each of these omissions creates significant deficiencies in
their respective programs. Requiring experience provides some
assurance of competence; demanding minimal capitalization assures financial vitality, at least initially. Each element should be
included in any effective regulatory scheme.
In addition to provisions designed to insure responsibility and
competence on the part of the general partner, each scheme
includes restrictions which eliminate the possibility of investment
by those who cannot safely bear the risk of loss. The SEC
establishes no investor suitability standards, but instead authorizes registered security associations to set such standards. The
MSCA establishes no explicit suitability standards but imposes
the responsibility for generating them on the broker. 8 ' The NASD
proposes to limit the investor's access to the market by erecting
both investor income and net worth barriers.
The propriety of these barriers is questionable, however, when
reviewed in the complete framework of the securities statutes. As
Professor Loss has observed of the Securities Act of 1933, "Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to
make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others
from making a fool of him."8 12 The proposals of the NASD and
the MSCA contemplate restrictions which contradict this basic
policy of securities law.8 3 The SEC proposal itself would allow

strict investor suitability standards to be imposed. Arguably con81 MSCA, supra note 7,§ Ill. In its original proposal dated May 18, 1972, the MSCA
barred participation in blind pool programs unless the investor had an income of at least
$35,000 and a net worth of $20,000. Midwest Securities Commissioners Association,
Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Limited Partnership, CCH 1972 BLUE SKY L.
REP. No. 445.
82

I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 128 (2d ed. 1961).

The initial choice between philosophies of regulation did not include controls on
investor access to the market, but was limited to a penalty for the broker's fraud or in the
alternative a requirement upon him of full disclosure.
Having come at long last to the point of legislating, Congress was faced with
a choice of conflicting philosophies. The diehards wanted to settle for a fraud
act ....Others, taking an in-between position, contended for a disclosure
83

law ....
...
At any rate, President Roosevelt chose the disclosure philosophy. And
it was that which won out and which seems now quite firmly entrenched so
far as the Securities Act of 1933 is concerned.

Id.at 121-22, 127.
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sistency with the federal securities law demands only that full
disclosure be made and that no restrictions be imposed on the
investor. Even the minimum investment prerequisite established
by the NASD and MSCA 8 4 seems contradictory to federal securities law policy; 8 5 the restriction, however, is less burdensome

than suitability standards.
2. Management Manipulation and Conflicts of Interest-The
second area of potential general partner abuse, self-dealing and
conflicts of interest, has also been confronted by each regulatory
scheme. General partner overcompensation is attacked in the
MSCA scheme by restricting compensation to an amount calcu86
lated at competitive local rates for services actually rendered.
Section IV of the proposal further spells out in schedule form
exactly what rates will be acceptable. Moreover the MSCA proposal allows general partner compensation only for brokerage,
87
property management, and partnership management services,
and specifically prohibits kickbacks and rebates.8 8
The NASD regulatory scheme incorporates a similar compensation schedule, differentiating among the rates allowed for oil
and gas, real estate, and all other programs.8 9 The scheme prohibits unfair and unreasonable compensation in general and specifically prohibits kickbacks, fees on dissolution of the partnership,
and real estate commissions on the purchase of property from
affiliates of the general partner.9 0 In addition, to prohibit the
general partner's absorbing all cash flow the NASD proposal
requires that selling fees be held in escrow until the limited partners recapture their total initial investments, limits real estate fees
to a single payment, and establishes the same competitive local
rate standard as the MSCA. 9 ' Finally, the NASD sets specific
percentage limitations on fees for certain facets of the operation of
84 See notes 58 and 65 and accompanying text supra.
85 See note 83 supra.
86 In addition to the general "reasonable" fees requirements, the MSCA specifically

limits the general partner's compensation for partnership management and promotional
services as follows:
(I) interest in profits-25 percent of the undistributed amounts remaining after the
investors receive 100 percent of their investments plus a 6 percent return, or
(2) (a) cash flow- 10 percent of cash flow after payment of 7 percent of investor capital,
and
(b) proceeds from property sales-15 percent after 100 percent investor recovery
plus 6 percent return and
(c) management fees must be based on cash flow. MSCA, supra note 7. § IV.
8
7 Id. § IV.
88
Id. § V. F.
8 See generally NASD, supra note 7, § 7.
90 Id. § 7(a).
91 Id.
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both oil and gas 9 2 and real estate programs. 93 The NASD characterizes these regulations as being drafted to recognize and follow
existing industry practices whenever possible unless the public
94
interest requires otherwise.

The SEC approach is entirely different. Rather than regulate
compensation rates directly, the SEC would require that fees be
regulated by contract, delegating the authority to regulate the
areas of sales literature, sales charges, suitability, and classifica95
tion of management compensation to the NASD.
Each proposal recognizes that some conflicts of interest may be
tolerated as long as controls against abuse are imposed. In confronting the conflicts of interest problem, the MSCA specifically
prohibits loans to the general partner, 96 acquisition of property in
other programs in which the general partner has an interest, 9 7 and
exclusive employment of the syndicator to purchase or sell property for the program. 98 Additionally the general partner is prohibited from making a profit on loans to the program. 99 The MSCA
does, however, permit the partnership to purchase or lease property in which the general partner has an interest as long as the
transaction, if fully disclosed, 10 0 occurs at the time of partnership
92 Compensation

for general partners in oil programs, is limited as follows:
(1) 331/3 percent working interest or net profit in a lease after payout;
(2) 1/16 overriding royalty interest convertible after payout into a working interest or net
profits interest with a maximum of 25 percent;
(3) V1 overriding royalty interest in addition to working interest or a net profits interest
after payout with a maximum of 20 percent;
(4) 40 percent reversionary interest in the wells if no interest on development funds
advances by the sponsor is charged to the participants or the program. Payout occurs
when the proceeds from production attributable to a particular well equal the sum of all
costs. NASD, supra note 7, §§ I(z), 7(b). An overriding royalty interest is an interest in oil
and gas produced or in the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas, free of operating expenses
but subject in some cases to production taxes and transportation charges. Id. § I(x). A
working interest is an operating interest entitling the holder to a share of production under
an oil and gas lease which carries with it the obligation to bear a corresponding share of all
costs associated with the production of income. Id. § I(uu). A reversionary interest is an
interest in a program the benefits of which accrue in the future upon the occurrence of
some event, commonly payout. Id. § 1 (11).
93 NASD real estate compensation limitations are as follows:
(I) administration fees-/2 of I percent of gross assets or 2/2 percent of equity whichever is less;
(2) promotional services-25 percent of cash flow;
(3) sale of property-only limit is that participants must receive total investment first;
(4) leasing fees-prohibited;
(5) financing of same property-only one fee may be charged for financing any one
piece
of property. NASD, supra note 7, § 7(c).
9
4 Id. at 23.
9- SEC,supra note 7, at 13.
96 MSCA, supra note 7, § V. A(3).
97 Id. §§ V. A(4), H.
98
1d. § V. F.
99
1d. § V. 1(1).
00
1 1d. § V. A. (l)(a).
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formation 10 ' and is priced at or below fair market value as independently appraised.' 0 2 In addition, sales or leases to the general partner must involve a guaranteed leaseback on terms no more
03
favorable than would be offered others.'
The NASD similarly prohibits only some general partner
conflicts of interest. The theory is that if abuses are regulated,
conflicts of interest which may be beneficial to the partnership can
be tolerated.' 0 4 The NASD prescribes two controls over permissible conflicts: disclosure of conflicts in the prospectus, 10 5 and
application of a price to property transactions between the partnership and an affiliate of the general partner which reflects cost
or fair market value, depending on the nature of the program and
the date relative to partnership formation of general partner acqui06
sition.'
Those conflicts which the NASD finds impermissible include
(1) sales of property between programs with the same general
partners, 0 7 (2) renting of program property to general partners as
principal or prime tenants except under a guaranteed leaseback
term,' 0 8 and (3) sales of professional services such as legal and
accounting services. 109 Although an oil and gas general partner
cannot own property adjacent to the program's property, such an
arrangement is legitimate for real estate programs 1" if disclosed
in the prospectus. Finally no sales of property or services are
legitimate to blind pools unless specifically disclosed."'
The SEC prohibits transfers of property between the general
partner and the program except those transfers which provide the
program with the advantage of cost or fair market value pricing,
whichever is lower." 2 The program in addition must report to the
limited partners the details of these transfers." 3 Pursuing further
possibilities of abuse, the SEC prohibits the acquisition by an oil
and gas program of participation units in another oil and gas

101 Id.
1021d. § V. A(I)(b).
103

104

Id.

§ V. A(2).

NASD, supra note 7, at 13.
1
0id. § 4(a).
1' Id. §§ 4(a)(I), (2), (3). If the general partner acquired the property after formation of
the107
program it must be sold to the partnership at the lower of cost or fair market value.
1d. § 4(b)(3).
1 08
1d. § 4(b)(1).
'°id. § 4(b)(2).
'"Id. § 4(b)(4).
"I Id. § 4(b)(5).
2
11 SEC supra note 7, § 18(a)( I).
113 Id. § 18(a)(2).
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program," 4 and bars the general partner from drilling for his own
5
account on partnership land."
Although the MSCA, NASD, and SEC share similar attitudes
toward toleration of controlled conflicts of interest, their approaches to general partner compensation are divergent in two
respects. The proposals disagree as to the propriety of regulating
rates of compensation in the first instance; 116 and secondly, if
regulation is deemed appropriate, they chose dissimilar modes of
effecting that regulation. The necessity for external regulation to
supercede free enterprise bargaining mechanisms proceeds from
the ineffectiveness of those devices in adequately protecting one
contracting party from abuse by another. The existence and tenor
of these three regulatory proposals suggests that the bargaining
process is not as effective a device as it should be in protecting
the interests of limited partners. Both the NASD and MSCA
proposals abandon attempts at rejuvenating the bargaining device
and substitute specific percentage maximum fees which the general partner may not exceed. In contrast, the SEC does not address
the topic of rate determination directly anywhere in the proposed
statute. It does, however, insure the parties' opportunity for bargaining by requiring management contracts to be accepted by a
7
majority of the limited partners."
The federal government has endorsed the policy of reliance on
industry self-regulation in controlling mutual fund management
fees, which in many respects is analagous to regulating fees for
blind pool limited partnership management."" In developing an
appropriate test to assure reasonable mutual fund management
fees in the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,119 the
Congress expressly disclaimed any intent to regulate rates
directly.' 2 0 Notwithstanding the analogy, Congress might not
choose to rely on the bargaining process if faced with the higher
risk limited partnership situation. If the bargaining process is not
: 14 1d. §§ IO(a), (b).
151d. § 18(e).

n1 GSee text accompanying notes 86- 95 supra.
17 SEC, supra note 7,§ 13(b).
18 Mutual fund management companies invest the funds of institutional investors which
represent shareholders who are in much the same position as limited partners. The
management company invests the funds in common stocks at their professional discretion,
just as the general partner of a blind pool program invests in real estate. See generally
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Act of December 14, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
119Id.

120 "Your committee recognizes the fact that the investment advisor is entitled to make
a profit. Nothing in the bill is intended to imply otherwise .... It is not intended to
introduce general concepts of rate regulation as applied to public utilities. S. Rep. No.
91-184, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. 6 (1969).
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acceptable, alternative means of regulation must be evaluated in
terms of their capacity to effect the policy of insuring reasonable
fees for general partners.
The SEC's reinforcement of the bargaining process no doubt
will be less effective as program sizes swell to accommodate
greater numbers of investors and general partners become more
remote. The influx of investors precipitates a seller's market
where contracts become standardized, units of partnership interests are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and bargaining
ceases.
In contrast, the MSCA and NASD fixed percentages provide
absolute standards which the general partner cannot ignore, but
they virtually guarantee that the maximum fees will also become
minimum fees. The increasingly independent general partner in
the face of a disorganized group of limited partners can be
expected to contract for maximum permissible fees. An alternative would be to redefine the fiduciary duty of general partners as
the standard of good faith conduct in respect to management fees,
as was contemplated in the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970 with the courts empowered to determine when the
duty is breached. 121 Absent definitive standards, however, this
alternative imposes a burden on the courts which at the threshold
bespeaks inconsistent decisions. Combining the NASD/MSCA
maximum rate concept with the SEC reinforcement of the bargaining process would stimulate the parties to bargain, but would
safeguard participants from a bargaining failure by the imposition
of uniform maximum limits. Both the NASD and MSCA, however, would probably need to condition the use of this standard
upon consistency with state law, as the power to approve management fees may be construed as a violation of the ULPA Section 7
12 2
control test.
3. Miscellaneous Abuses-Nondisclosure of program financial
data, activity data, and tax status rulings militates against a participant's capacity to bargain meaningfully and invest intelligently.
Each of the three proposals specifically details the information
which the general partner must disclose. In addition to those
disclosures already discussed,123 both the NASD and MSCA put
121

22

1

123

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970) reads in part:

[T]he investment advisor of a registered investment company shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
for services .... An action may be brought under this subsection by the
Commission or by a security holder ....
See notes 138-43 and accompanying text infra.
See text accompanying notes 63 and 105 supra.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:465

restrictions on the content of projected income literature. 124 Furthermore, each requires full disclosure of tax status through 1 a
ruling of the Internal Revenue Service or opinion of counsel. '
The MSCA requires the actual issuance of a favorable tax ruling
before a program's units can be freely transferable, 26 while the
NASD would permit an investor to withdraw entirely upon a
subsequent unfavorable ruling. 127 The MSCA also demands that
reports be given to the limited partners of all the program's
activities and interests, 2 8 that details of general partner compensation be disclosed, 2 9 that all records be accessible at reasonable times, 30 and that audited financial statements be distributed.1 3 ' Similarly, the NASD would require quarterly reporting of all relevant facts including program progress information,
revenue receipt and disbursement information, 132 annual audited
financial statements, and reports containing relevant tax informa3

tion.13

Although it requires the disclosure of property transfers in
which a conflict of interest inheres, 34 the SEC has no provision
specifying what financial data must be disclosed. Instead the oil
program must transmit to its participants only information and
financial data which the Commission may have prescribed.' 35 In
view of the importance of information in the investment and
124 After describing required and prohibited content, the NASD proposal provides in
Schedule I a hypothetical illustration of an acceptable discussion of tax treatment of a
$10,000 investment in an oil and gas program, and in Schedule 2 a hypothetical illustration
of tax treatment of cash flow on a per $1.00 basis, as examples of acceptable projections.
While the MSCA provides no examples it requires that projections be realistic, that
assumptions be clearly identifiable, and that they incorporate all known facts regarding
the partnership. It prohibits altogether projections on unimproved land. NASD, supra note
7, § 10; MSCA, supra note 7, § VIII. C.
1
2NASD, supra note 7, § 2(e)(1); see also text accompanying notes 60 and 63 supra.
Section 2(c)(I) requires that any sales literature referring to federal tax treatment should
reference
an IRS ruling or counsel's opinion.
1 26
MSCA, supra note 7, §§ VIII. C(3), B(13), VII. F. See also note 35 supra for a
discussion of the relationship between free transferability of partnership shares and tax
treatment.
12 7
NASD, supra note 7, § 2(e)(1).
128
MSCA, supra note 7, § Vi. C.
129
Id. § VI. C.
0
13
Id. § V II. D.
131Id. § VII. C.
132 Oil and gas programs during the drilling phase must disclose quarterly in detail the
progress of the drilling operations and the amount of production. NASD, supra note
7, § 9(a).
133 Id. § 9(b).

134 SEC, supra note 7,§ 18(a)(2).
135
Id. § 26(c) provides:
Every registered oil program shall transmit to the holders of its program
participants at least semi-annually, reports containing such information and
financial statements ... as the Commission may prescribe by rules and regulations for the protection of investors ....
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bargaining process, an effective regulatory scheme should explicitly include generous reporting requirements. In this regard the
SEC proposal establishes an insufficient minimum, forcing the
investor to depend on the Commission to promulgate further
reporting requirements.
While all programs require disclosure of program tax status,
conflicts of interest, and periodic financial statements, the NASD
and SEC proposals omit important information. The MSCA
makes the most complete demands, requiring disclosure of virtually everything regulated in its proposal, including tax status,
general partner net worth, conflicts of interest, property descriptions, pending suits, financial statements, and income projections.
The NASD likewise has a strong disclosure program, but it omits
important areas such as general partner net worth and experience,
pending suits, and description of partnership property. The SEC
fails explicitly to require disclosure of general partner net worth
and experience, income projections, property descriptions, and
general partner compensation. Under the SEC proposal, unless
the Commission establishes comprehensive disclosure requirements, the investor is privy to the least information; consequently
the proposal is unlikely to prevent fraud or to enable the investor
to bargain intelligently.
IV.

COLLATERAL EFFECTS

Although the purpose of these proposals is to regulate potential
program abuses, some provisions might precipitate the loss of
certain investment program advantages. For example, the provisions in each of the proposals permitting the removal of a partner
or requiring his employment to be approved by vote of the limited
partners13 6 as well as the SEC's provisions allowing investors to
vote on fundamental policy decisions13 7 endanger the investor's
limited liability.
Section 7 of the ULPA protects a limited partner from general
liability unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers
as a limited partner, he takes part in control of the business. Thus
any interference with or participation in the conduct or control of
the partnership business may transform the limited partner into a
general partner for purposes of expanding liability. 13 8 The essen136 MSCA, supra note 7, § VII. B(3); SEC, supra note 7, § 13; NASD, supra note
7, § 3(a) (1). See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
137 SEC, supra note 7, § II; see note 74 supra.
138 See Feld, The "Control Test"for Limited Partners, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1969).
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tial question in any such determination is, of course, what constitutes control. The ULPA in Section 9 permits limited partners
to veto (1) any act contravening the partnership certificate which
defines the participants' rights inter se, (2) any act making it
impossible to carry out the ordinary business of the partnership,
(3) confession of judgment, (4) use of partnership property for
other than a partnership purpose, (5) admission of another general
or limited partner, or (6) continuation of the business after the
general partner dies, unless the certificate provides otherwise.' 3 9
It is unclear whether power to remove current partners is
sufficiently different from the permissible power to veto new ones
so as to justify the imposition of general liability. Moreover, in a
40
recent New York case, Riviera CongressAssociates v. Yassky,'
the court permitted the limited partners to sue in behalf of the
partnership itself and in effect replace the general partner where
the general partner failed to collect rental payments from an
affiliated tenant in the partnership's building. The court reasoned
that the statute, New York's version of the ULPA,14 1 which bars
limited partners as improper parties in a suit in behalf of the
partnership, is intended to restrain the limited partners from interfering with the rights of general partners to carry on the business
of the partnership. Thus where the general partner has failed to
carry on the business of the partnership, the limited partners may,
without loss of limited liability, step in to collect overdue rent.
Yassky, however, says nothing about replacement of a general
partner who is "carrying on the business" to the limited partners'
dissatisfaction.
In deciding whether a removal power constitutes substantial
control 14 2 prohibited by Section 7 of the ULPA, one commentator suggests the following test: powers which include the
right to initiate matters and decide them entirely within the group
of limited partners constitute substantial control; powers confined
to approval of actions of the general partner are no greater than
shareholders usually have and are not very substantial. 43 Clearly
139

ULPA § 9.

14048

Misc.2d. 282, 264 N.Y.S.2d. 624, (Sup. Ct. 1965) affd, 18 N.Y.2d. 540, 223

N.E.2d. 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d. 386 (1966).
141 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP
Supp. 1972).

LAW §§90-119 (McKinney

1948), as amended, (McKinney

142 California has confronted this limited liability question squarely and has statutorily
created a right in the limited partner to elect or remove general partners as long as voting
powers appear in the partnership certificate. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West 1963).
43Bromberg,

supra note 3, at 147.
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removal of a general partner against his will is more substantial
control than approval of his actions. Indeed, it is disapproval
carried to the farthest limit. In contrast, another commentator,
after reviewing alternative constructions of the control test concludes that the test should be measured
by the most logical rationale for holding the limited partner
liable: to prevent third parties from mistakenly assuming that
the limited partner is a general partner and relying on his
general liability .... Under this view of the control test only

activities which conceivably could induce reasonable reliance, such as supervision of the partnership's day to day
activities, should produce general liability.1 44
This conclusion is reached notwithstanding the absence of any
specific reference to creditor's reliance as a basis for liability in
Section 7, although the draftsmen do have this reference in Section 5 prohibitions against using the limited partner's name in the
partnership name. Under this latter test, a removal power would
hardly fall into the routine business activity of the partnership. In
any event, all three proposals have recognized the problem and
have moved to avoid it. Both the MSCA and NASD condition
the inclusion of voting rights on their consistency with limited
liability under state law. 145 If state law clearly prohibits the removal power, the limited partnership must operate without it. On
the other hand, the SEC simply preempts state law, 14 6 presumably
avoiding the problem altogether.
If in fact the MSCA and NASD voting proposals do conflict
with state law, the dissatisfied limited partner is stripped of some
of his self-help remedies and is relegated to civil suit for breach of
fiduciary duty under Section 21 of the UPA. Furthermore, if the
validity of the removal power remains undecided in the state of
partnership formation, the NASD and MSCA escape clauses may
be impotent in protecting the investor's limited liability. Where
limited partners are sued by creditors and the state court ultimately holds that the removal power does indeed violate the law, the
NASD and MSCA cannot retroactively extract the removal
clauses from the existing certificate.

44
145

1 Feld, supra note 138. at 1479.

MSCA, supra note 7, § VII. B: NASD, supra note 7,§ 3.
supra note 7,§§ 13(c), II(d).

146 SEC,
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V. CONCLUSION

With the revival in popularity of the limited partnership and the
discovery of several unique means of exploiting it, interstate
bodies both governmental and private have roles to play in discouraging abuse of limited partnerships. This is especially true in
view of the inadequacy of the ULPA and existing blue sky regulations in confronting the problem. Existing regulatory proposals
vary considerably, however, in their effectiveness and collateral
consequences.
The MSCA proposal attempts generally to insure the solvency
and competency of general partners while strengthening the bargaining power of limited partners through disclosure requirements, eliminating assessments and forfeitures, and attacking
conflicts of interest without unduly restricting the investor's access to the market with its minimum investment amounts and
suitability requirements. Its primary deficiencies appear to be
potential jeopardy to the limited partner's limited liability which
the voting removal power may entail and the inflexible standards
restricting the parties' actual capacity to bargain about general
partner compensation.
Directly remedying the fewest abuses, the NASD proposal
sufficiently strengthens the bargaining power of the limited partner
and demonstrates an enlightened approach to conflicts of interest,
separating useful conflicts from unacceptable ones. Unfortunately,
the NASD proposal, like the MSCA proposal, restricts the parties' rights to contract for general partner compensation and may
jeopardize the investor's limited liability through the removal voting privilege. In addition, the NASD severely restricts the investor's access to the market with income, net worth, and other
suitability requirements.
Midway between the other two in terms of effective control of
abuses, the SEC proposal attacks the bargaining process problem
with strict forfeiture and assessment controls. Although the Commission's proposal provides for use of the bargaining process in
the determination of general partner fees, it fails to establish a
ceiling to prevent fees from reaching an unreasonable level in the
event of bargaining failure. Notwithstanding its conflicts of interest provisions for fair prices on sales or purchases of program
property and the prescribed disclosures required in that regard, its
other disclosure provisions are insufficient to insure the transmission of essential information to the investor. Finally, although
the SEC does not directly limit investor access to the market with
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suitability requirements, it authorizes registered securities associations to do so.
A model proposal might incorporate the following elements as
being the most desirable characteristics of the three proposals.
First, to insure competency, solvency, and responsibility in management, the proposal should establish minimum general partner
net worth and experience requirements. In addition it should
require a sufficient minimum capitalization to support the funding
requirements of the intended program.
Second, to preserve the limited partner's investment equity, an
ideal program should prohibit assessments except to meet tax
increases, and restrict nonpayment penalties to fair, nonforfeiture
provisions. In addition, to promote investor sophistication, the
model should demand disclosure by the general partner of the
program's high-risk potential. The proposal should not, however,
erect barriers to investment defined in terms of investor income
level and net worth or minimum investment amount, if it is to
reflect prevailing securities law policy.
As a fourth item, to insure that a reasonable compensation level
for general partners is achieved but not exceeded, the proposal
should establish rate determination procedures which both promote participant bargaining and define a ceiling above which fees
cannot climb. Likewise, to preserve the benefits of selected
conflicts of interest while avoiding the collateral abuses, a fifth
program element should establish specific procedures and cost
guides for partnership transactions where the general partner has
an adverse financial interest.
Moreover, to enhance the investor's bargaining position, the
model should require generous disclosure of partnership financial
statements, cash flow statements, general partner conflicts of interest, general partner compensation, partnership tax status stated
in opinions and rulings, and comparisons of projections to actual
investment results. Finally, to avoid collateral loss of limited
liability while insuring the responsiveness of the general partner to
limited partner interests, the proposal should also include a general partner removal power, exercisable by the limited partner and
supplemented by an opinion of counsel as to its consistency with
state law.
Legislation and guidelines designed to protect the limited partner from unscrupulous general partners must additionally avoid
jeopardizing tax and limited liability advantages adhering to the
limited partnership organizational form. To erect general partner
restrictions at the expense of program advantages would neces-
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sarily discourage investors from utilizing a flexible device which is
becoming an increasingly important element in the financing of
real estate, oil and gas, and other high-risk but important industries.
-

Ivan J. Schell

